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Six	  years	  after	  people	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  protest	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  organisation	  across	  the	  
Middle	  East,	  efforts	  to	  shape	  the	  future	  of	  the	  region	  continue.	  Amidst	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  states,	  
individuals	  retreated	  into	  local	  identities	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  security	  and	  meet	  basic	  needs,	  placing	  
extra	  pressure	  on	  the	  state	  to	  maintain	   its	  position	  as	  the	   locus	  of	  power.	  When	  coupled	  with	  the	  
challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  ethno-­‐religious	  organisation	  of	   the	  Middle	  East,	   the	  regional	  state	  system	  
that	   emerged	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Sykes-­‐Picot	   negotiations1	   began	   to	   fragment.	   Across	   the	  
Middle	   East,	   myriad	   identities	   operate	   across	   national,	   tribal,	   ethnic,	   sectarian,	   religious,	   gender,	  
class	  and	  age	  groupings	  and	   to	   reduce	  such	  movements	   to	  homogenous	  opposition	  movements	   is	  
infelicitous.	  Despite	   this,	   the	  existing	   literature	  on	   the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  has	   focussed	  predominantly	  
upon	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   states	   and	   the	   structural	   factors	   that	   have	   fed	   into	   the	   protest	  
movements,	   leaving	   implicit	   –	   or	   worse,	   ignoring	   –	   questions	   of	   agency	   and	   identity	   politics	   that	  
should	   feature	  prominently	   in	   the	  analysis.	  Frustration	  at	   the	  denial	  of	  basic	  needs	  challenged	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  state	  and	  led	  to	  the	  empowerment	  of	  agency	  that	  largely	  remains	  underexplored.	  
As	  Ibn	  Khaldun	  notes	  in	  The	  Muqaddimah,	  “politics	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  administration	  of	  home	  or	  
city	  in	  accordance	  with	  ethical	  and	  philosophical	  requirements,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  directing	  the	  mass	  
toward	  a	  behaviour	  that	  will	   result	   in	  the	  preservation	  and	  permanence	  of	  the	  (human)	  species”.	   2	  
Across	   the	   history	   of	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   attempts	   to	   avoid	   political	   instability,	   structural	   factors	  
have	  long	  restricted	  the	  possibility	  of	  agency	  to	  shape	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  organisation.	  It	  is	  clear	  
that	   for	  Khaldun,	  politics	   is	   fundamentally	  about	  people	  and	   that	  both	   structure	  and	  agency	  must	  
play	  a	  prominent	  role	   in	  political	  activity,	  yet	  all	   too	  often,	   the	   latter	   is	  omitted	  from	  analysis.	  The	  
organisation	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  authority	  has	  marginalisted	  agency	  across	  the	  region,	  largely	  in	  an	  
attempt	   to	   retain	   power.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   these	   events,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   explore	   the	  
structural	   factors	   that	  have	  shaped	   the	  nature	  of	   states	  and	  political	   conditions	  across	   the	  Middle	  
East	  and	  from	  this,	  to	  explore	  agency.	  	  
This	  article	  contributes	  to	  these	  debates	  by	  applying	  the	  work	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben3	  to	  the	  post	  Arab	  
Uprisings	   Middle	   East,	   to	   understand	   the	   relationship	   between	   rulers	   and	   ruled	   and	   the	  
fragmentation	   of	   the	   sovereign	   state.	   In	   this	   paper	   I	   argue	   that	   to	   understand	   changing	   regime-­‐
society	  relations	  and	  the	  ensuing	  fragmentation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  states	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  we	  must	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See:	  Fromkin,	  Peace	  to	  End	  
2	  Khaldoun,	  The	  Muqaddimah	  39.	  	  	  
3	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer.	  	  
	  	  




consider	   structures	   that	   have	  marginalised	   agency	   and	   then	  bring	   agency	  back	   into	   the	   analysis.	   I	  
begin	  by	  outlining	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  before	  offering	  a	  brief	  genealogy	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
sovereignty	   and	   the	   state	   building	   project	   in	   the	   region.	   I	   then	   discuss	   authority	   and	   territoriality	  
before	  arguing	  that	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  facilitated	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  
bare	   life	  helps	  us	  to	  reintroduce	  agency	  and	   its	   impact	  upon	  political	  and	  security	  dynamics	  of	  the	  
Middle	  East.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sovereignty	  and	  Bare	  Life	  
The	  1648	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  mark	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  modern	  sovereign	  state,	  based	  
upon	   the	   premise	   of	   states	   possessing	   exclusive	   authority	  within	   their	   territorial	   borders	   and	   the	  
principle	  of	  non-­‐interference.4	   For	   Stephen	  Krasner,	  building	  upon	  a	   legacy	  of	  Weberian	   thought,5	  
there	   are	   three	   elements	   to	   conventional	   understandings	   of	   sovereignty:	   international	   legal	  
sovereignty,	  Westphalian	   sovereignty	   and	   domestic	   sovereignty,6	   taken	   to	   operate	   in	   conjunction	  
with	  each	  other.	  Others	  such	  as	  James	  Caporaso	  stress	  that	  the	  interaction	  of	  authority,	  territoriality	  
and	  citizenship	  is	  necessary	  for	  states	  to	  possess	  sovereignty.7	  The	  idea	  of	  territoriality	  is	  contested	  
yet	  essential	  as	  it	  bring	  together	  space	  and	  authority,	  defining	  the	  borders	  within	  which	  political	  life	  
can	  occur.	  	  
To	  argue	  that	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  life	  occurs	  solely	  within	  the	  state	  defined	  as	  a	  fixed	  unit	  
of	   space	   is	   problematic,8	   especially	   when	   the	   concept	   is	   complicated	   by	   religion,	   ideology	   and	  
tribalism.	  Alternative	  methods	  of	  engaging	  with	  sovereignty	  and	  relations	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  
have	  been	  provided	  by	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  who	  are	  concerned	  with	  
the	  ability	  to	  organise	  and	  control	  life.	  For	  Foucault,	  sovereignty	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  “the	  right	  
to	  take	  life	  or	  let	  live”9	  while	  for	  Schmitt,	  sovereignty	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  power	  that	  is	  able	  to	  
determine	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  law,	  when	  ‘a	  state	  of	  exception’	  can	  be	  declared.10	  	  
Agamben’s	   work	   on	   sovereignty	   is	   grounded	   in	   biopolitics,	   concerned	   with	   the	   organisation	   and	  
control	  of	  human	  life,	  and	  targeted	  by	  the	  governance	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  Agamben’s	  discussion	  of	  
sovereignty	   begins	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   Schmidt’s	   ideas	   of	   the	   state	   of	   exception,	   which	   are	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important	  when	  considering	  the	  emergence	  of	  bare	  life.	  For	  Agamben,	  “the	  rule,	  suspending	  itself,	  
gives	  rise	  to	  the	  exception	  and,	  maintaining	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  exception,	  first	  constitutes	  itself	  
as	   a	   rule”.11	   Ultimately,	   in	   the	   declaration	   of	   a	   state	   of	   emergency,	   the	   rendering	   of	   people	   as	  
vulnerable	  and	  controlling	  life	  and	  death	  means	  that	  bare	  life	  is	  returned	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  politics,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  	  
As	  Agamben	  argues,	  	  
the	   realm	  of	  bare	   life	  –	  which	   is	  originally	   situated	  at	   the	  margins	  of	   the	  political	  order	  –	  gradually	  
begins	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  political	  realm,	  and	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion,	  outside	  and	  inside,	  bios	  and	  
zoe,	  right	  and	  fact,	  enter	  into	  a	  zone	  of	  irreducible	  indistinction.	  At	  once	  excluding	  bare	  life	  from	  and	  
capturing	   it	   within	   the	   political	   order,	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   actually	   constituted,	   in	   its	   very	  
separateness,	  the	  hidden	  foundation	  on	  which	  the	  entire	  political	  system	  rested.12	  	  
Thus,	  the	  sovereign	  differentiates	  between	  the	  realms	  of	  bios	  and	  zoe,	  creating	  a	  binary	  distinction	  
between	  those	  recognised	  as	  fully	  human	  through	  their	  participation	  in	  political	  life	  and	  those	  who	  
are	   outside,	   as	   political	   life	   and	   meaning	   is	   stripped	   from	   them,	   in	   bare	   life.	   Here,	   we	   must	  
remember	  the	  biopolitical	  dimension	  of	  Agamben’s	  sovereignty,	  which	  seeks	  to	  regulate	  life,	  rather	  
than	   being	   based	   upon	   exclusion.	   Homo	   Sacer	   engages	   with	   questions	   about	   the	   relationship	  
between	  rulers	  and	  ruled,	  with	   the	  title	   referring	  to	  an	   individual	   from	  ancient	  Rome	  who	  may	  be	  
killed	  with	  impunity	  as	  long	  as	  this	  is	  outside	  of	  a	  religious	  ritual	  because	  their	  life	  is	  worthless.13	  The	  
marginalisation	  of	  people	  into	  the	  condition	  of	  bare	  life	  can	  occur	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
different	  contexts	  and	  processes,	  yet	   in	  attempting	  to	  escape	  these	  conditions,	  violent	  dislocations	  
can	  occur	  between	  regimes	  and	  society,	  as	  witnessed	  in	  the	  Arab	  uprisings.	  	  
In	  The	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Glory,	  Agamben	  builds	  upon	  these	  ideas,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  real	  problem,	  the	  
central	  mystery	  of	  politics	  is	  not	  sovereignty,	  but	  government	  […]	  it	  is	  not	  the	  law,	  but	  the	  police-­‐that	  
is	  to	  say,	  the	  governmental	  machine	  that	  they	  form	  and	  support”	  14	  [italics	  in	  original].	  This	  ultimately	  
suggests	   that	  politics	   is	   comprised	  of	   the	   constituent	  parts	  of	   government,	   structures	  both	   formal	  
and	   informal,	   which	   build	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   state.	   Identifying	   and	   engaging	   with	   these	  
structures	   is	  then	  imperative	  when	  considering	  political	  change	  and	  its	  processes.15	  This	  distinction	  
between	   government	   machinery	   and	   those	   constrained	   by	   it	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   to	  
differentiate	  between	   rulers	  and	   ruled,	  between	   regimes	  and	   society	  and	   it	   is	  here	  where	  we	  can	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build	  upon	  Agamben’s	  work	  to	  allow	  for	  greater	  discussion	  of	  those	  regulated.	  Building	  upon	  this,	  in	  
constructing	   the	   relationship	   between	   sovereign	   rule	   and	   biopolitical	   exception,	   Agamben	   argues	  
that	  the	  camp	  –	  with	  displaced	  meaning	  -­‐	  is	  the	  “hidden	  matrix	  of	  politics”16	  and	  as	  such,	  captures	  all	  
of	   political	   life.	   Such	   a	   conclusion	   has	   severe	   ramifications	   for	   political	   action,	   with	   the	   camp	  
transcending	  the	  concentration	  camp	  of	   the	  Nazi	   rule	   to	   include	  anything	   that	  can	  delimit	  a	  space	  
where	  normal	  order	  is	  suspended,	  meaning	  that	  each	  one	  of	  us	  can	  be	  homines	  sacri.	  	  
The	   increasing	   prominence	   of	   Agamben	   within	   International	   Relations	   has	   stimulated	   a	   vibrant	  
debate	   over	   the	   application	   of	   his	   ideas	   to	   the	   contemporary	  world.17	   One	   of	   the	  main	   points	   of	  
tension	   in	   Agamben’s	  work	   is	   concerned	  with	   his	   understanding	   of	   biopolitics,	  which	   builds	   upon	  
Foucault’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  term,	  seeking	  to	  ‘correct’	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  notably	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  rise	  of	  biopower	  heralded	  the	  emergence	  of	  modernity.18	  Instead,	  Agamben	  argues	  that	  politics	  
is	  always	  biopolitics,	  as	   the	  political	   is	  shaped	  by	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  and	   its	  production	  of	  bare	  
life.	  	  Another	  point	  of	  contention	  concerns	  the	  lack	  of	  development	  of	  this	  monolithic	  construction	  
of	   bare	   life,19	   which	   can	   differ	   depending	   upon	   context	   and	   conditions.	   Nor	   does	   Agamben	  
differentiate	  between	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  and	  totalitarian	  regimes;	  rather,	  he	  suggests	  that	  it	  
is	  the	  division	  between	  bios	  and	  zoe	  that	  is	  the	  most	  important	  characteristic	  of	  political	  life.20	  Such	  
ambiguity	   allows	   us	   to	   apply	   these	   ideas	   across	   a	   region	   that	   has	   a	   range	   of	   different	   political	  
systems.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  damning	  criticism	  of	  Agamben’s	  work,	  however,	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  agency	  and	  
its	  action	  against	  structural	  conditions.21	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  structural	  factors,	  both	  formal	  and	  informal,	  
are	  central	  to	  our	  discussion	  of	  sovereignty;	  moreover,	  that	  agency	  operates	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  
structural	   parameters.	   Yet	   Agamben’s	   approach	   is	   guilty	   of	   restricting	   agency,	   removing	   socio-­‐
economic	   contexts	   that	   are	   essential	   for	   understanding	   the	   relativity	   of	   different	   situations.	   Even	  
within	  restrictive	  conditions,	  individuals	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  exercise	  agency,	  no	  matter	  how	  remote	  
the	  possibility;	  as	  Dan	  Bousfield	  articulates,	  even	  the	  refugee	  can	  exercise	  agency.22	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Agamben,	  Mittel	  ohne	  Zweck,	  48.	  
17	  See:	  Closs	  Stephens	  and	  Vaughan-­‐Williams,	  Politics	  of	  Response,	  Pin-­‐Fat,	  Edkins	  and	  Shapiro,	  Sovereign	  Lives	  
2004,	  Prozorov,	  Three	  Theses	  on	  ‘Governance’.	  
18	  For	  purposes	  of	  brevity,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  Agamben’s	  claims	  will	  be	  left	  to	  other	  scholars.	  For	  
an	  introduction,	  see	  Owens,	  Reclaiming	  ‘Bare	  Life’?	  
19	  Levy,	  Refugees,	  Europe.	  	  
20	  Lemke,	  A	  Zone	  of	  Indistinction,	  8.	  
21	  	  Walters	  Acts	  of	  Demonstration.	  
22	  Bousfield,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sovereignty.	  	  	  
	  	  




Agamben	  responds	  to	  this	  criticism	  by	  suggesting	  that	  agency	  is	  re-­‐asserted	  by	  taking	  ownership	  of	  
the	  condition,	  as	  “putting	  life	   into	  play”.23	  To	  claim	  ownership,	  one	  has	  to	  accept	  the	  conditions	  of	  
‘being	   thus’	   and	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   conditions	   within	   which	   one	   exists.	   Even	   this	   lacks	  
methodological	  development,	  failing	  to	  adequately	  explore	  the	  impact	  of	  agency	  upon	  structures,	  as	  
agency	  also	  operates	  prior	  to	  being	  and	  both	  prior	  to	  and	  post	  restructuring.	  Returning	  agency	  to	  the	  
discussion	   allows	   for	   a	   greater	   analysis	   of	   political	   change	   and	   considering	   the	   structural	   change	  
within	  society,	  both	  formally	  and	  informally.	  
Agamben	  speaks	  of	  the	  destruction	  of	  identities	  (and	  agency)	  through	  desubjectivation,	  the	  gradual	  
destruction	   of	   identities,	   and	   resubjectivation,	   the	   reshaping	   of	   destroyed	   identities.	   If	   individuals	  
exercise	   agency	   then	   this	   is	   a	   resubjectivation	   of	   the	   self.	   In	   Agamben’s	  work,	   sovereignty	   is	   fully	  
constituted	   as	   the	   only	   conceptual	   space	   within	   which	   the	   logic	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   sound	   but	   this	  
concept	  merges	  potentiality	  and	  being,	  where	  potentiality	  can	  only	  be	  viewed	  retroactively.24	  Slavoj	  
Žižek’s	  response	  to	  this	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  must	  be	  an	  act	  prior	  to	  being,	  “overlooking	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   order	   of	   being	   is	   never	   simply	   given,	   but	   is	   itself	   grounded	   in	   some	   preceding	  Act”.25	   By	  
accepting	  Žižek’s	  point,	  we	  take	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  process	  that	  is	  on-­‐going	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  logical	  
consistency	  and	  by	  focussing	  upon	  the	  act,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  return	  agency	  to	  our	  project.	  In	  The	  Use	  of	  
Bodies,	  Agamben	  engages	  with	  ontology	  and	  potentiality	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  suggests	  that	  sovereignty	  
should	   be	   a	   process,	   an	   act	   that	   repeats	   itself,	   which	   supports	   both	   the	   need	   to	   do	   this	   and	   the	  
scope	  for	  us	  to	  do	  so.	  
In	   spite	   of	   these	   problems,	   Agamben’s	   approach	   provides	   valuable	   scope	   to	   engage	   with	  
contemporary	  events	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  It	  allows	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  structural	  conditions	  
helps	   to	   understand	   the	   influences	   upon	   agency	   and	   their	   actions.	   As	   Raymond	   Hinnebusch	  
suggests,	   a	   structural	   analysis	   allows	   us	   to	   identify	   both	   the	   origins	   and	   roots	   of	   instability.26	  
Hinnebusch’s	   approach	   goes	   a	   step	   further,	   arguing	   that	   this	   type	   of	   approach	   can	   engage	   with	  
questions	  about	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  although	  this	  is	  for	  another	  time	  and	  
another	   place.	   Let	   us	   then	   turn	   to	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	   begin	   our	   project	   by	   first	   outlining	   the	  
structural	   factors	   that	   have	   resulted	   in	   political	   life	   being	   stripped	   from	  people	   across	   the	  Middle	  
East,	  before	  considering	  the	  need	  to	  return	  agency	  to	  our	  project.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Agamben,	  Profanations.	  	  	  
24	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer,	  45.	  
25	  	  Žižek,	  The	  Ticklish	  Subject	  238.	  	  
26	  Hinnebusch,	  Middle	  East	  in	  World	  Hierarchy,	  240.	  
	  	  




The	  Formation	  of	  States	  
Structures	   do	   not	   emerge	   from	   a	   vacuum;	   they	   are	   shaped	   and	   determined	   by	   the	   world	   that	  
surrounds	  them.	  Since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  colonial	  activity	  has	  shaped	  regional	  politics,	  
as	   Israel,	   Iraq,	   (Trans)	   Jordan,	   Lebanon,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   the	   Gulf	   Sates	   and	   Syria	   all	   experienced	   a	  
colonial	  influence	  in	  their	  formation,	  best	  seen	  in	  legacy	  of	  Sykes–Picot	  agreement.27	  Following	  this,	  
several	   states	   were	   created	   by	   the	   colonial	   powers	   whilst	   sectarian	   identities	   were	   manipulated	  
across	   these	   new	   forms	   of	   political	   organisation	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  maintain	   control	   and	   influence.28	  
Efforts	   to	   ensure	   regime	   survival	   in	   the	   nascent	   phases	   of	   state-­‐building	   would	   have	   long-­‐term	  
consequences	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   structural	   violence	   and	   latent	   grievances	   that	   would	  
manifest	  with	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  political	  organisation.	  	  
Within	   several	   states	   are	   a	   range	   of	   challenges	   to	   the	   centralised	   ruler,	   including	   from	   religious	  
actors	  and	  tribal	  leaders.	  In	  turn,	  this	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  diffusion	  of	  power	  from	  the	  core,	  resulting	  in	  
an	   increase	   in	   the	   power	   of	   actors	   on	   the	   periphery	   and	   increased	   instability.	   A	   second	   serious	  
problem	  is	  a	   lack	  of	   territorial	  clarity,	  which,	   in	  part,	  stems	  from	  the	  creation	  of	   the	  regional	  state	  
system.	  These	  borders	  have	  often	  resulted	   in	  the	  separation	  of	   ‘tribal’,	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  groups	  
across	   the	   region,	   which	   ultimately	   poses	   problems	   for	   regime	   calculations	   of	   both	   internal	   and	  
external	  security.	  	  
In	   response	   to	   these	   challenges,	   rulers	   have	   imposed	   structures	   to	   secure	   their	   rule	   whilst	   also	  
cultivating	   narratives	   –	   serving	   as	   normative	   structures	   –	   to	   increase	   legitimacy	   for	   internal	   and	  
external	  audiences.	  Several	  states	  have	  referred	  to	  pan-­‐state	  ideologies	  –	  Arabism	  and	  Islamism	  –	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  unite	  peoples	  across	  the	  region,	  which	  has	  often	  occurred	  out	  of	  national	  interest.	  Both	  
these	  strategies	  involve	  referring	  to	  ideologies	  that	  transcend	  state	  borders	  and	  thus	  challenge	  the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  state	  system.	  Referring	  to	  leadership	  of	  the	  umma29	  has	  led	  some	  to	  
suggest	  that	  states	  have	  no	  real	  power	  and	  that	  true	  authority	  –	  sovereignty	  –	  can	  only	  be	  found	  in	  
God.	  	  
Competition	  between	   regime	  and	   religious	  authority	   is	   also	   found	  within	   Judaism,	  where	   tensions	  
between	   the	   State	   of	   Israel	   and	  numerous	   Zionist	   organisations	   has	  manifested	   in	   the	   building	   of	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  A	  Line	  in	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  that	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illegal	   settlements	  outposts	   in	   the	  West	  Bank.	  Organisations	   such	  a	  Gush	  Emunim	  and	   the	  Hilltop	  
Youth	  have	  conducted	  attacks	  against	  the	  state	  and	  Palestinians	  while	  also	  failing	  to	  recognise	  the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   state	   of	   Israel,	   in	   a	   number	   of	   cases,	   seeking	   to	   bring	   about	   its	   downfall.	   Latest	  
estimates	  suggest	  that	  over	  500,000	  people	   live	   in	  settlements	   in	  the	  West	  Bank,30	  with	  a	  growing	  
number	  living	  in	  Area	  B,	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  Oslo	  Accords.31	  Of	  course,	  questions	  about	  territorial	  limits	  
of	  political	  organisation	  play	  an	  increasingly	  important	  role	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  
relationship	  between	  regimes	  and	  people.	  
What	   should	   not	   be	   forgotten	   is	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   region	   has	   been	   and	   continues	   to	   be	  
penetrated	  by	  external	  powers	   in	  a	  range	  of	  ways.32	  From	  the	  Sykes-­‐Picot	  agreement	  until	  present	  
day	  military	  activity	  in	  Syria,	  external	  powers	  have	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  nature	  of	  
regional	   politics	   and	   the	   daily	   life	   of	   individuals,	   with	   tensions	   emerging	   between	   states	   and	  
economic	  forces	  driven	  by	  the	  core.33	  Whilst	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  is	  placed	  upon	  security	  factors,	  
it	  should	  also	  be	  remembered	  that	  such	  penetration	  has	  an	   impact	  economically.34	  Such	  economic	  
penetration	  occurs	  through	  states	  but	  also	  through	  private	  companies	  and	  individuals,	  who	  continue	  
to	   reproduce	   economic,	   political	   and	   legal	   structures	   that	   feed	   into	   the	   (re)construction	   of	   the	  
sovereign	  state.	  Whilst	  the	  discovery	  of	  oil	  was	  heralded	  to	  facilitate	  autonomy	  and	  strength	  across	  
the	  region,	  the	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  that	  emerged	  contributed	  to	  economic	  structures	  that	  fed	  
into	  dependency	  across	   the	   region.35	  Of	  course,	  over	   time	  these	   relationships	  have	  changed,36	  but	  
patron-­‐client	  relations	  continue	  to	  penetrate	  –	  and	  shape	  –	  the	  region.	  	  
Territoriality	  
While	  politics	   is	   inherently	  about	  people,	  space	   is	  the	  theatre	  within	  which	   interactions	  that	  shape	  
politics	  take	  place.	  These	   interactions	  exist	  within	  one	  another	  and	  co-­‐exist	  within	  power	  relations	  
and	   social	  practices;	   territoriality	   is	   the	   concept	  of	  political	  organisation	  within	   space.	  For	  political	  
organisation	   to	   be	   territorial,	   organisations	   have	   to	   be	   coterminous	   with	   spatial	   borders,	   which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  B'Tselem,	  an	  Israeli	  Human	  Rights	  organization,	  puts	  this	  number	  at	  547,000	  people	  living	  in	  125	  
government	  sanctioned	  settlements	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  a	  further	  100	  settlement	  outposts.	  See:	  B’tselem,	  
Statistics	  on	  Settlements	  and	  Settler	  Population.	  	  	  	    	  
31	  The	  designation	  of	  areas	  A,	  B	  and	  C	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  facilitate	  the	  Israeli	  military	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  West	  
Bank	  and	  the	  transfer	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  as	  part	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  According	  to	  Dror	  Etkes,	  an	  
anti-­‐settlement	  activist,	  ‘the	  takeover	  of	  land	  in	  Area	  B	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  unbridled	  thievery	  by	  settlers	  and	  
impotence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Israeli	  authorities”.	  See:	  Eldar,	  West	  Bank	  Outposts	  	  	  
32	  Brown,	  International	  Politics.	  	  
33	  Halliday,	  Politics	  of	  Differential	  Integration	  
34	  See:	  Hinnebusch,	  Middle	  East	  in	  World	  Hierarchy,	  232	  
35	  See:	  Alnasarwi,	  Nationalism,	  Oil,	  and	  Bromley,	  Hegemony	  and	  World	  Oil.	  	  
36	  See:	  
	  	  




determine	  where	  political	  organisations	   (do	  not)	  operate;	   sovereignty	   is	   then	  exclusionary	  violent.	  
To	   reach	   this	   point,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   define	   –	   and	   secure	   -­‐	   a	   people,	   or	   citizenry.	   As	   Benedict	  
Anderson	  argues,	  national	   identity	   is	  a	  constructed	   identity,	  reproduced	  through	  a	  range	  of	  means	  
to	   cultivate	   shared	  memories.37	   Amidst	   demographic	   change	   and	   population	   growth,	  maintaining	  
links	   across	   all	   members	   is	   impossible	   yet	   the	   development	   of	   technologies	   to	   appeal	   to	   a	   mass	  
audience	  helps	  to	  circumvent	  these	  challenges.	  	  
People	   operate	   and	   exist	   within	   particular	   areas,	   which	   are	   governed	   by	   particular	   systems	   of	  
governance.	  While	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  term	  territoriality	  suffices,	  as	  it	  deals	  with	  political	  
organisation	  within	  a	  bounded	  territory,	  the	  concept	  of	  governmentality	  provides	  a	  greater	  analytic	  
clarity.	  Governmentality	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  how	  human	  conduct	  is	  directed	  and	  regulated,	  
within	   and	   beyond	   state	   institutions,	   between	  men	  and	   things,38	  by	  which	  Mick	  Dillon	  means	   the	  
interaction	  of	   actors	   and	  nature	  of	   those	   interactions.39	   From	   this,	   governmentality	   is	   a	   structural	  
procedure,	  yet	  it	  is	  largely	  designed	  to	  reflect	  these	  issues	  on	  the	  ground	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  inherently	  
shaped	   by	   agency.40	   From	   this,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   state	   is	   dispersed	   and	   distributed	   through	   state	  
agencies,	   although	   it	  must	   be	   seen	   and	   performed	   for	   this	   to	   occur.	  Governmentality	  must	   occur	  
within	  a	  clearly	  defined	   territory,	  which	   is	  different	   to	  an	  empire	  or	   tribes,	  who	  exercise	  authority	  
over	  people	  not	  territory.	  
The	  process	  of	  state-­‐building	  attempts	  to	  establish	  systems	  of	  governmentality	  and	  territoriality	  to	  
circumvent	   challenges	   to	   regime	   stability	   and	   security,	   and	   while	   governmentality	   draws	   upon	  
agency	   to	   find	   traction	   within	   the	   norms	   and	   cultures	   of	   a	   society,	   agency	   is	   simultaneously	  
marginalised	   and	   utilised.	   To	   understand	   territoriality	   and	   governmentality,	  we	  must	   engage	  with	  
the	  concept	  of	  authority	  and	  with	   it,	   the	  norms	  and	  social	  structures	  that	  are	  prevalent	  across	  the	  
region.	  Locating	  agency	  within	  this,	  be	  it	  through	  a	  consideration	  of	  a	  citizen	  or	  something	  excluded,	  
helps	  not	  only	  to	  shape	  structures	  but	  also	  to	  understand	  political	  action.	  
Authority	  and	  Autonomy	  
While	   often	   intertwined,	   authority	   and	   autonomy	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   discussions	   of	   sovereignty.	  
Authority	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   various	   individuals	   and	   groups,	   ranging	   from	   family	   hierarchies,	   tribal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  is	  perhaps	  more	  of	  an	  ideal	  than	  a	  reality.	  See:	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Foucault,	  Governmentality	  	  	  
39	  Dillon,	  Sovereignty	  and	  Governmentality,	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40	  Governmentality	  need	  not	  connote	  a	  negative	  power;	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  productive	  and	  formative	  dimension	  of	  
power.	  
	  	  




leaders,	   religious	  officials,	   regional	  officers,	  employers	  to	  rulers	  but	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  sovereign	  
state,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  these	  forms	  of	  authority	  have	  coalesced	  into	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  within	  
a	  particular	  territory.	  Across	  the	  Middle	  East,	  however,	  regime	  authority	  –	  and	  autonomy	  -­‐	  are	  often	  
challenged	  by	   actors	   operating	  both	   at	   a	   sub-­‐state	   and	   supra-­‐state	   level.	   At	   a	   sub-­‐state	   level,	   the	  
melange	   of	   identities	   poses	   a	   challenge	   to	   demographic	   coherence,	   from	   ethnicity,	   tribalism	   or	  
religious	   difference.	   This	   has	   an	   impact	   upon	   societal	   security,41	   where	   identity	   groups	   operating	  
within	  a	  particular	  area	  are	  securitised42	  against	  an	  ‘other’.	  	  
This	   increasing	   securitisation	   results	   in	   groups	   retreating	   within	   other	   aspects	   of	   their	   identities,	  
which	   often	   offer	   a	   form	   of	   authority.	   The	   ethno-­‐religious	   construction	   of	   the	   region	  means	   that	  
political	   instability	  all	   too	  often	  emerges	   from	  ethnic	  or	   religious	  challenges,	  with	  the	  potential	   for	  
regional	  consequences,	  such	  as	  in	  Iraq,	  Lebanon,	  Bahrain	  and	  Palestine.	  A	  further	  challenge	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  states	  with	  strong	  tribal	  societies,	  what	  Joel	  Migdal	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  “strong	  societies	  and	  
weak	   states”.43	   Weak	   states	   are	   those	   who	   are	   unable	   to	   enforce	   governance	   structures,	   to	  
“penetrate	  society,	  regulate	  social	  relationships,	  extract	  resources,	  and	  appropriate	  or	  use	  resources	  
in	  determined	  ways”.44	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  structures	  that	  regulate	  authority	  can	  be	  both	  formal	  
and	   informal	   –	   included	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   political,	   legal,	   economic,	   normative	   and	   religious	   –	  
stemming	  from	  a	  range	  of	  sources.	  	  
Tribal	  kinship	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  when	  understanding	  sources	  of	  authority45	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Khaldun	  
is	  again	  helpful	  when	  understanding	  its	  importance.	  Elucidating	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  ties	  within	  the	  
communities,	   Khaldun	   places	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   asabiyya	   for	   collective	  
security,46	   which	   “strengthens	   [a	   group’s]	   stamina	   and	   makes	   them	   feared,	   since	   everybody’s	  
affection	   for	  his	   family	   and	  group	   is	  more	   important”	   than	   for	  others.47	   Such	  an	  extension	   can	  be	  
applied	  to	  the	  building	  of	  collective	  identities,	  although	  tensions	  can	  emerge	  when	  state	  formation	  
clashes	  with	  tribal	  loyalties.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Buzan,	  Societal	  security,	  state	  security.	  	  	  
42	  The	  process	  of	  securitization	  has	  been	  discussed	  at	  length	  elsewhere	  (see:	  Buzan,	  Waever	  and	  de	  Wilde,	  
Security,	  Balzacq,	  Faces	  of	  Securitization,	  McDonald,	  Securitization	  and	  Construction)	  I	  build	  upon	  this	  
approach	  to	  explore	  how	  particular	  identities	  are	  framed	  as	  existential	  threats	  by	  regimes	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  
maintain	  security	  and	  stability.	  	  
43	  Migdal,	  Strong	  Societies	  Weak	  States.	  
44	  Ibid,	  4.	  	  
45	  Particularly	  those	  on	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula,	  but	  also	  within	  Iraq	  and	  Iran.	  	  
46	  Champion,	  The	  Paradoxical	  Kingdom,	  64.	  
47	  Khaldoun,	  The	  Muqaddimah,	  263.	  
	  	  




The	  action	  of	  Da’ish	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  helps	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  this.	  Understanding	  the	  importance	  
of	  tribal	  authority,	  Da’ish	  quickly	  sought	  to	  secure	  the	  support	  of	  tribal	  leaders	  and	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  
Dabiq	   documented	   the	   “extensive	   history	   of	   building	   relations	   with	   the	   tribes”.48	   Senior	   Da’ish	  
figures	  also	  met	  with	  tribal	  elders	  and	  dignitaries,	  cultivating	  pledges	  of	  allegiance	  and	  bayaa.	  The	  
group	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  tribal	  norms	  and	  customs,	  while	  also	  returning	  rights	  and	  property	  
to	   their	   ‘rightful’	   owners	   and	   ensuring	   security	   and	   stability.	   Da’ish	   has	   also	   grounded	   its	  
governmentality	   within	   tribal	   norms	   and	   customs,	   becoming	   aware	   that	   ensuring	   stability	   and	  
security	  in	  areas	  under	  its	  control	  –	  within	  the	  context	  of	  structures	  already	  known	  to	  people	  living	  
there	  –	  was	  essential	  to	  maintaining	  control	  of	  the	  territory.	  	  	  	  
Such	  strategies	  within	  state-­‐building	  projects	  are	  not	  new.	   	   Ibn	  Saud	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  strategies	   in	  
order	  to	  unite	  disparate	  groups	  with	  differing	  claims	  of	  authority	  across	  the	  peninsula,	  including	  the	  
use	   of	   force,	   the	   continued	   alliance	  with	   the	  Wahhabist	  movement,	   and	   processes	   of	   inter-­‐tribal	  
marriage.49	  Despite	   initial	  successes,	  the	  state-­‐building	  process	  within	  Saudi	  Arabia	  continues,	  with	  
the	  Al	  Saud	  employing	  detribalisation	  strategies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  authority	  with	  
their	  ruling	  family	  at	  the	  top.50	  Other	  states	  have	  not	  been	  as	  successful	  in	  resolving	  tribal	  tensions.51	  
As	  Clive	  Jones	  pertinently	  notes,	  Yemen	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  range	  of	  serious	  challenges,	  notably	  “endemic	  
tribalism”,	  sectarianism,	  a	  rebellion	  in	  the	  north	  with	  a	  growing	  secessionist	  movement	  in	  the	  south,	  
a	  strong	  Al	  Qa’ida	  franchise	  and	  Da’ish	  all	  exerting	  centrifugal	  pressures	  on	  state	  authority.52	  	  
Regime	   authority	   can	   also	   be	   challenged	   by	   supra-­‐state	   ideologies,	   the	  most	   prominent	   of	  which	  
were	   pan-­‐Arabism	   and	   pan-­‐Islamism.	   While	   ultimately	   both	   movements	   failed	   due	   to	   the	  
renaissance	   of	   nationalist	   agendas,	   the	   legacy	   of	   these	   pan-­‐‘isms’	   demonstrates	   the	   existence	   of	  
competing	   sources	  of	   authority.	   The	  pan-­‐Arab	  movement	  with	  Gamal	  Abdl	  Nasser	   at	   its	   vanguard	  
suggested	   that	   the	  Arab	   states	  were	   subservient	   to	   a	   larger	   collective,	   to	  umma	  arabiyya	  wahida	  
dhat	  risala	  khalida,	  the	  ‘one	  Arab	  nation	  with	  an	  immortal	  mission’.53	  This	  vision	  eviscerated	  states	  
and	   societies	  and	  eroded	   their	   agency,	   claiming	   to	   speak	   for	   the	   ‘Arab	  Street’,	   leaving	   the	  nation-­‐
state	  in	  its	  wake.	  Rulers	  aware	  of	  the	  power	  of	  this	  narrative	  would	  tap	  into	  a	  source	  of	  legitimacy	  
that	  transcended	  domestic	  reserves,	  despite	  its	  threat	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  and	  used	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its	  symbolic	  power	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  engender	  popular	  support.54	  The	  birth	  of	  pan-­‐Islamism	  stemmed	  
from	  a	  desire	  to	  challenge	  the	  pan-­‐Arab	  discourse	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  attempt	  to	  counter	  the	  rising	  
power	   of	  Nasser’s	   Egypt	   by	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   Islamic	   unity.55	   A	   pure	   pan-­‐Islamist	   vision	  
also	  held	  Middle	  East	  states	  to	  be	  transient	  entities,	  working	  towards	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  Muslim	  
world,	   yet	   the	   ideology	   was	   increasingly	   used	   for	   political	   ends.	   Ultimately,	   both	   ideological	  
movements	  were	  brought	  down	  by	  the	  enduring	  power	  of	  the	  nation	  state.56	  
Both	   pan-­‐Arabism	   and	   pan-­‐Islamism	   appealed	   to	   a	   sense	   of	   asabiyya	   amongst	   the	   people	   of	   the	  
region.	   Their	   instrumentalised	   use	   can	   also	   cause	   tensions	   as	   regimes	   realise	   the	   power	   of	   these	  
identities.	  For	  instance,	  in	  post	  revolutionary	  Egypt,	  President	  Al	  Sisi	  sought	  to	  restrict	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  pan-­‐Islamic	  narrative	  by	  restricting	  the	  space	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  –	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  
actors	  –	   in	  a	  move	   that	  was	  quickly	   followed	  by	   Jordan.	  Of	   course,	   to	   speak	  of	   terms	  such	  as	  Pan	  
Arabism,	  Pan	  Islamism	  and	  the	  ‘Arab	  Street’	  is	  to	  homogenise	  peoples	  under	  a	  broad	  banner	  term,	  
once	  more	  resulting	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  agency.	  To	  engage	  more	  with	  the	  interaction	  of	  people	  within	  
these	   ideologies,	   a	   deeper	   analysis	   of	   the	   agents	   involved	   within	   these	   identities	   along	   with	   the	  
cleavages	  within	  such	  movements	  is	  required.	  	  	  
In	   response	   to	   these	   challenges,	   regimes	   have	   implemented	   structures	   that	   seek	   to	   restrict	   the	  
possibility	   of	   agency,	   while	   holding	   together	   the	   fabric	   of	   political	   organisation.	   State-­‐building	  
processes	  seek	  to	  circumvent	  these	  challenges	  and	  establish	  a	  framework	  ensuring	  regime	  security	  
and	   stability	   whilst	   the	   existence	   of	   structures	   to	   circumvent	   challenges	   results	   in	   a	   range	   of	  
different	   structural	   pressures	   across	   states.	   The	   onset	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprisings	   meant	   that	   long-­‐
standing	   grievances	   across	   the	   region	  would	   erupt	   in	   political	   unrest.	   The	  manifestation	   of	   latent	  
political	   structures	   in	   violence	   would	   not	   be	   a	   new	   feature	   of	   Middle	   Eastern	   politics	   but	   the	  
increasing	   challenges	   to	   state	  authority	  would	  present	  new	  opportunities	   to	   respond	   to	   threats	   in	  
different	  ways.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  centrifugal	  pressures	  on	  regimes	  and	  competing	  sources	  of	  authority,	  a	  number	  of	  
regimes	  used	  the	  perception	  of	  competing	  sources	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  means	  of	  retaining	  control.	  The	  
Shi’a	  of	  the	  region	  have	  long	  been	  framed	  as	  a	  minority	  5th	  column,	  seen	  to	  be	  doing	  the	  bidding	  of	  
Iran	  and	  the	  post-­‐uprisings	  climate	  allowed	  this	  threat	  to	  be	  exacerbated.	  Regimes	  sought	  to	  secure	  
the	  support	  of	  domestic	  populations	  by	   framing	  opposition	  movements	  as	  groups	  that	  were	  doing	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the	   bidding	   of	   Tehran,	   ignoring	   a	   range	   of	   factors	   that	  would	   undermine	   such	   an	   argument.	   This	  
would	   secure	   support	   from	   domestic	   groups	   while	   also	   locating	   the	   struggle	   within	   broader	  
geopolitical	  tensions	  between	  the	  Sunni	  Arab	  Gulf	  states	  led	  by	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran.	  
While	  this	  ensured	  the	  support	  of	  regional	  allies,	  it	  also	  deepened	  tensions	  with	  Iran	  and	  restricted	  
political	   opposition	   across	   the	   archipelago.	   Concern	   at	   the	   “expansionist	   ambitions	   of	   the	   Persian	  
Shia	   establishment”,	   were	   also	   expressed	   in	   international	   media	   sources	   by	   the	   Bahraini	   Foreign	  
Minister,	  who	  blamed	  Iran	  for	  unrest	  in	  Bahrain,	  Lebanon,	  Kuwait	  and	  Yemen.57	  Such	  concerns	  about	  
Iranian	  involvement	  were	  also	  seen	  in	  Iraq,	  where	  Saudi	  officials	  urged	  the	  US	  not	  to	  “leave	  Iraq	  until	  
its	  sovereignty	  has	  been	  resorted,	  otherwise	  it	  will	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  Iranians”.58	  The	  rising	  Iranian	  
influence	   across	   Iraq	   and	   the	   perception	   of	   it	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   region	   would	   undermine	   regime	  
efforts	   to	  maintain	   a	  monopoly	   on	   authority,	   leading	   to	   increased	   insecurity	  within	   and	   between	  
states.	   Of	   course,	   the	   (perceived)	   involvement	   of	   external	   actors	   within	   a	   state	   also	   has	   serious	  
implications	  for	  governmentality.	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Bare	  Life	  	  
The	  interaction	  of	  these	  factors	  demonstrates	  how	  people	  can	  become	  marginalised	  and	  exist	  within	  
bare	   life,	  re-­‐introduced	   into	  politics	  through	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  state	  of	  exception.	  Within	  this	  context,	  
political	  life	  was	  stripped	  from	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  across	  the	  Middle	  East,	  where	  lives	  became	  
expendable	   as	   government	  machinery	   attempted	   to	   retain	   control,	   both	   formally	   and	   informally.	  
Such	   processes	   are	   on-­‐going,	   as	   regimes	   seek	   to	   maintain	   power	   and	   people	   engage	   with	   the	  
structures	  of	  politics.	  Following	  decades	  of	  exception	  and	  bare	  life,	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  were	  an	  outlet	  
for	  much	  of	  the	  frustration	  people	  had	  with	  governance	  structures	  regulating	  the	  state,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
struggle	  between	  regimes	  and	  societies	  and	  the	  (further)	  marginalisation	  of	  particular	  identities	  for	  
domestic,	   regional	  and	   international	  audiences.	  Put	  another	  way,	   the	  state	  of	  exception	  begot	   the	  
state	   of	   exception,	   whilst	   bare	   life	   begot	   bare	   life.	   As	   noted	   in	   The	   Kingdom	   and	   The	   Glory,	   to	  
understand	  politics	  –	  and	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  –	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  look	  at	  government	  and	  governance	  
structures	  within	  a	  state	  that	  serve	  the	  biopolitical	  project.	  The	  need	  to	  do	  this	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  
Arab	  Human	  Development	  Report	  2016,	  which	  argues	   “the	  events	  of	  2011	  and	   their	   ramifications	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are	   the	  outcome	  of	  public	  policies	  over	  many	  decades	   that	   gradually	   led	   to	   the	  exclusion	  of	   large	  
sectors	  of	  the	  population	  from	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  life”.59	  	  
Amidst	  a	  range	  of	  challenges	  including	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  a	  growing	  middle	  class60	  and	  huge	  
demographic	  changes,	  notably	  a	  youth	  boom	  and	  a	  population	  increase	  of	  53%	  between	  1991	  and	  
2010,61	   the	   authoritarian	   social	   contract	   began	   to	   fragment.	   Before	   the	  uprisings	   the	  middle	   class	  
was	  largely	  stable,	  yet	  political	  marginalisation,	  coupled	  with	  the	  rising	  price	  of	  essentials	  -­‐	  notably	  
bread	  –	  would	  alter	  this	  stability.	  A	  Human	  Development	  Report	  that	  tracked	  change	  between	  2009	  
and	   2014	  offers	   greater	   insight	   into	   change	   at	   this	   time,	   noting	   a	   positive	   change	  of	   +10	   in	   Saudi	  
Arabia,	   facilitated	   by	   the	   $96	   billion	   package	   of	   social	   reform,	   and	   Syria,	   experiencing	   a	   negative	  
change	  of	   -­‐15.62	  Additionally,	  with	   the	  existence	  of	   states	  of	   exception	  across	   the	   region,	   perhaps	  
best	   characterised	   by	   Egypt’s	   Emergency	   Laws,	   people	   were	   marginalised	   by	   legal	   and	   political	  
structures,	  with	  political	  life	  stripped	  from	  them.	  From	  this,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  uprisings	  we	  
must	   identify	   both	   the	   conditions	   and	   the	   structures	   that	   facilitated	   the	   biopolitical	   project	   and	  
ultimately,	  bare	  life.	  
The	   story	  of	  post-­‐invasion	   Iraq	  demonstrates	   the	   impact	  of	   these	   changes.	   Post	  2003	   the	  political	  
landscape	  underwent	  a	  rapid	  upheaval	  through	  the	  deba’athification	  process	  and	  the	  installation	  of	  
a	  Shi’a	  led	  government	  in	  Baghdad.	  These	  structural	  changes,	  both	  political-­‐legal	  and	  normative	  also	  
shaped	   the	   nature	   of	   governmentality,	   with	   institutions	   also	   taking	   orders	   from	   organisations	  
beyond	  the	  state.	  Moreover,	  the	  evisceration	  of	  state	  infrastructure	  in	  post-­‐invasion	  Iraq	  left	  many	  
Sunnis	  unemployed	  amidst	   chaos	   and	   increasing	   Shi’a	  militancy.63	  As	   the	   governments	  of	  Nouri	   al	  
Maliki	   and	   Haider	   al	   Abadi	   pursued	   sectarian	   agendas,	   promoting	   Shi’a	   causes	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
Sunni	  and	  non-­‐sectarian	  Iraqi	  causes,	  Sunni	  Iraqis	  became	  increasingly	  squeezed	  by	  the	  government,	  
militias	  and	  Sunni	  militancy,	  leaving	  many	  fearing	  for	  their	  lives.	  	  
Ultimately,	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   ensure	   that	   basic	   needs	   were	   met,	   a	   number	   of	   Sunnis	   from	   Anbar	  
Province	  turned	  to	  groups	  such	  as	  Da’ish	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  government	  and	  the	  
militias	   that	   were	   increasingly	   targeting	   Sunnis	   across	   the	   state.64	   Shi’a	   militias,	   freed	   from	   the	  
shackles	  of	  decades	  of	  marginalization	  and	  discrimination	  under	  Saddam,	  coupled	  with	  the	  weakness	  
of	  the	  government	   in	  Baghdad	  were	  able	  to	  commit	  acts	  of	  violence	  seemingly	  with	   impunity	  and,	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often,	   with	   implicit	   support	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   state.	   Moreover,	   systems	   of	   governance	  
designed	   to	   protect	   people	   became	   sites	   of	   contested	   authority,	   with	   the	   police	   at	   this	   time	  
“controlled	   not	   by	   the	  MOI	   but	   by	   ISCI/Badr,	   particularly	   in	   Karbala,	   Diwaniyah,	   and	  Nasiriyah”.65	  
From	   this,	  men	  wearing	  police	  and	  army	  uniforms	  attacked	  Sunni	   individuals	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   their	  
sectarian	   identity	  and	  such	  practices	  became	  routine	  across	  parts	  of	   Iraq	  with	  sectarian	  tensions.66	  
This	   structural	   violence	   has	   resulted	   in	   discrimination,	   forced	   unemployment,	   violence	   and	  
ultimately,	  bare	  life.	  With	  the	  prioritisation	  of	  particular	  groups,	  typically	  those	  that	  provide	  support	  
to	  the	  regime	  and	  help	  to	  ensure	  its	  survival,	  be	  it	  along	  sectarian,	  ethnic,	  tribal	  –	  or	  even	  economic	  
–	  lines,	  those	  identities	  have	  their	  political	  existence	  stripped	  from	  them	  and	  as	  such	  exist	  outside	  of	  
the	  political	  system.	  	  
Bahrain	   provides	   another	   example	   of	   longstanding	   structural	   grievances	   resulting	   in	   unrest.	   In	  
February	   2011,	   decades	   of	   latent	   grievances	   regarding	   social	   and	   economic	   factors,	   political	   and	  
legal	   questions,	   religion,	   and	   ethnicity,	   manifested	   in	   large-­‐scale	   protests	   across	   the	   archipelago.	  
Historically,	   Shi’a	   religious	   celebrations	  of	  Mahrram	  and	  Ashura	  provided	  an	  outlet	   for	  discontent,	  
firmly	  associating	  the	  Shi’a	  with	  unrest	  in	  Bahrain.67	  Over	  time,	  in	  response	  to	  this	  unrest,	  the	  regime	  
offered	  largely	  cosmetic	  reforms	  that	  were	  supported	  by	  measures	  aimed	  at	  restricting	  action.68	   In	  
response	   to	   the	   2011	   uprisings,	   the	   Al	   Khalifa	   regime	   responded	   with	   force,	   creating	   a	   sectarian	  
master	   narrative	   that	   further	   marginalised	   the	   Shi’a	   population,	   politically,	   legally	   and	  
economically.69	  The	  master	  narrative	  also	  moved	  into	  the	  cultural	  and	  private	  realms,	  pervading	  all	  
facets	  of	  public	  and	  private	  life.70	  Physical	  force	  –	  from	  Saudi	  led	  GCC	  troops	  and	  Sunni	  Asians	  in	  the	  
riot	  police	  –	  was	  supplemented	  with	  allegations	  of	  Iranian	  involvement	  within	  the	  protests71	  and	  the	  
continuation	   of	   structures	   to	   restrict	   action.	   Moreover,	   another	   strategy	   was	   to	   strip	   citizenship	  
from	   prominent	   individuals	   complicit	   in	   the	   protests,	   as	   an	   additional	   attempt	   to	   regulate	  
behaviour.72	  	  
As	   the	   uprisings	   continued	   across	   the	   region,	   revolution	   and	   counter-­‐revolution	   vied	   for	   control,	  
with	   structural	   factors	   resulting	   in	   increased	   marginalisation	   of	   people.	   In	   Egypt,	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
Mubrak	  era	  resulted	  in	  a	  democratically	  elected	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  regime	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	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Mohammad	  Morsi,	  which	  also	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  emergency	  legislation	  to	  maintain	  security	  and	  
stability.73	  The	  counter	  revolution	  that	  toppled	  Morsi,	  violently	  banned	  the	  group’s	  supporters	  from	  
political	  life	  in	  Egypt,	  imprisoning	  thousands	  of	  Muslim	  Brothers	  and	  their	  supporters,	  along	  with	  the	  
massacre	  of	  over	  a	  thousand	  of	  the	  group’s	  supporters	  on	  14th	  August,	  2013	  in	  Cairo.74	  	  
The	   fragmentation	  of	  states	  and	  their	   structures	  would	  also	   result	   in	  conditions	  of	  bare	   life	  across	  
the	   region.	   The	   Syrian	   civil	   war	   has	   resulted	   in	   almost	   500,000	   deaths	   and	   around	   11	   million	  
displacements,	   4	   million	   externally	   and	   7	   million	   internally	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   struggle	   for	  
political	  engagement	  and	  the	  ensuing	  stripping	  of	  political	   life	   from	  opponents	  of	   the	  regime.	  This	  
places	  an	  undeniable	  burden	  upon	  neighbouring	   states,	   a	  number	  of	  whom	  are	  not	   signatories	  of	  
refugee	  treaties	  and	  lack	  the	  domestic	  infrastructure	  to	  responsibly	  deal	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  millions	  of	  
people.	  With	  a	  population	  of	  4	  million,	  Lebanon	  has	  taken	  in	  around	  1.5	  million	  refugees	  from	  Syria,	  
raising	   the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  are	   living	   in	  extreme	  poverty	   in	   the	   state	   to	  almost	  3	  million.75	  
Moreover,	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   Lebanon	   not	   signing	   the	   1951	   Refugee	   Convention,	   Syrians	   in	  
Lebanon	  have	  limited	  legal	  status	  and	  face	  a	  precarious	  life.	  
A	   large	   number	   of	   people	   across	   the	   region	   lack	   citizenship	   but	   remain	   subject	   to	   domestic	  
legislation	   and	   governmentality.	   Given	   the	   conditions	   within	   which	   some	   of	   the	   non-­‐citizens	   are	  
working	   in	   often	   without	   protection	   from	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   state,	   considering	   interactions	  
between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  must	  also	  include	  non-­‐citizens.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  kafala	  system	  is	  
perhaps	  the	  best	  indication	  of	  bare	  life	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  as	  a	  structure	  that	  limits	  the	  possibility	  of	  
agency,	   restricting	   the	   movement	   of	   individuals	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   passports	   are	   often	   held	   by	  
employers.76	   Regimes	   have	   manipulated	   and	   created	   structures	   to	   facilitate	   difference	   and	   to	  
orchestrate	   loyalty	  whilst	  repressing	  the	  capacity	  of	  agency	  to	  act.	  This	   is	   largely	  embedded	  within	  
governmentality,	  built	  upon	  a	  local	  context	  but	  the	  prominence	  of	  non-­‐citizen	  populations	  across	  a	  
number	  of	  states	  means	  that	  these	  structures	  and	  the	  norms	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  grounded	  require	  
moulding.	  	  	  
Within	  the	  context	  of	  fragmenting	  sovereignty,	  which	  left	  states	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  political	  ambitions	  
of	  others,	  regimes	  manipulated	  events	  to	  ensure	  their	  own	  survival.	  In	  this	  context,	  Islamic	  rhetoric	  
was	   increasingly	   used	   as	   a	   cloak	   for	   geopolitical	   agendas,	   best	   seen	   through	   Iranian	   and	   Saudi	  
Arabian	   efforts	   to	   increase	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   vitality	   of	   their	   own	   rule	   for	   internal	   and	   external	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audiences.77	   Schisms	   within	   the	   Muslim	   world	   would	   also	   serve	   as	   a	   means	   of	   undermining	  
governmentality,	   authority	   and	   autonomy,	   as	   individuals	   faced	   often-­‐contradictory	   guidance	   from	  
competing	  sources	  of	  authority.	  Religious	  difference	  would	  lead	  to	  increasingly	  securitized	  divisions	  
and	  also	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  tool	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  retain	  security	  after	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings.	  	  
Accusations	  of	  5th	  column	  across	  the	  region,	  comprising	  fears	  of	  a	  Shi’a	  Crescent’78	  doing	  the	  bidding	  
of	   Iran,	   once	   more	   denying	   the	   agency	   of	   local	   organisations	   and	   failing	   to	   appreciate	   that	   the	  
stronger	  seat	  of	  Shi’a	  thought	  is	  within	  Najaf	  rather	  than	  in	  Qom.	  Iranian	  support	  for	  groups	  such	  as	  
Hizballah	  and	  the	  Islamic	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Bahrain	  would	  increase	  tensions,79	  leading	  to	  the	  
politicizing	  and	   securitizing	  of	   sectarian	  differences	   that	  have	   regional	   consequences	   to	   this	  day.80	  
Reflecting	   concerns	   at	   Iranian	   influence,	   Saudi	   officials	   urged	   the	   US	   to	   “cut	   off	   the	   head	   of	   the	  
snake”81	  and	  lamented	  the	  Iranian	  penetration	  of	  Iraq.	  Another	  cable	  suggested	  that	  Maliki	  was	  “an	  
Iranian	  agent”,82	  further	  adding	  to	  this	  climate	  of	  suspicion.	  	  
From	   these	   events,	   it	   becomes	   increasingly	   apparent	   that	   despite	   suffering	   marginalisation,	  
discrimination	   and	   securitization	   –	   resulting	   in	   conditions	   of	   bare	   life	   across	   the	   region	   –	   it	   is	  
imperative	  to	  bring	  agency	  back	  into	  the	  discussion.	  While	  focussing	  upon	  structure	  clarifies	  certain	  
facets	   of	   political	   organisation,	   structure	   is	   grounded	   in	   -­‐	   and	   indeed	   shaped	   by	   –	   agency	   and	   by	  
giving	  greater	  credence	  to	  the	  role	  of	  agency	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  rulers	  
and	  ruled,	  a	  greater	  awareness	  of	  political	  dynamics	  is	  facilitated.	  When	  considering	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
Middle	  Eastern	  politics	  across	   the	   last	  5	  years,	  while	  a	  number	  of	   ideologies	  and	  movements	  have	  
cut	   across	   the	   region,	   domestic	   political,	   social	   and	   economic	   conditions	   have	   resulted	   in	   protest,	  
driven	  by	  agency.	  The	  rejection	  of	  structures	  has	  resulted	  in	  widespread	  violence	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Syria,	  civil	  war.	  	  
Even	  within	   these	  cases,	  a	   sovereign	   resides,	  although	   their	   rule	   is	  often	  challenged	  by	  competing	  
visions	  of	  authority.	  Such	  opposition	  is	  often	  framed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  an	  existential	  struggle	  and	  
from	  it	  comes	  the	  state	  of	  exception.	  For	  many	  states,	  this	  transcends	  conflict	  and	  also	  exists	  within	  
the	   context	   of	   a	   process	   of	   securitization,	   often	   along	   sectarian	   lines	   and	   thus,	   occurring	   across	  
borders.	   Framing	   political	   tensions	   in	   such	   a	  way	   serves	   to	   remove	   agency	   from	  domestic	   groups	  
while	   also	   consolidating	   the	   support	   base	   of	   a	   ruling	   elite	   and	   eroding	   the	   traction	   that	   socio-­‐
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economic	   protest	   movements	   have	   been	   able	   to	   draw	   upon.	   Within	   this	   process,	   regimes	   are	  
moving	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  of	  bare	  life	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  both	  ensure	  their	  own	  survival	  while	  also	  
securing	  regional	  alliances.	  The	  onset	  of	  the	  Uprisings	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  focus	  solely	  
upon	  structure;	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  agency	  in	  political	  activity.	  
Bringing	  Agency	  Back	  
This	  approach	  only	  gets	  us	  so	  far,	  yet	  as	   far	  as	   it	  can	  take	  us,	   it	  helps	  us	  to	   identify	  the	  conditions	  
within	   which	   agency	   should	   be	   reintroduced	   to	   the	   discussion.	   An	   Agambian	   approach	   helps	   to	  
identify	  structural	   trends	  that	  are	  shaping	  the	  contemporary	  Middle	  East,	  but	   it	   is	   important	  to	  go	  
further.	  To	  facilitate	  this	  within	  the	  context	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings	  the	  need	  to	  bring	  
agency	  back	  into	  the	  discussion	  is	  imperative,	  achieved	  by	  engagement	  with	  Margaret	  Archer’s	  take	  
on	   the	   structure-­‐agency	  debate.83	   Archer’s	  Realist	   Social	   Theory	   argues	   for	   the	  merits	   of	   a	   critical	  
realist	  position,	  suggesting	  that	  structure	  and	  agency	  are	  autonomous	  and	  temporally	  separate	  with	  
structure	   necessarily	   predating	   agency.	   In	   it,§	   Archer	   offers	   a	   social	   theory	   with	   both	   strong	  
explanatory	   power	   and	   methodological	   strength,	   best	   encapsulated	   by	   the	   morphogenetic	   cycle.	  
Morphogenesis	  is	  the	  process	  of	  a	  thing	  “being	  shaped	  and	  reshaped	  by	  the	  interplay	  between	  their	  
constituents,	  parts	  and	  persons”,84	  with	  change	  occurring	  over	  4	  stages:	  	  
The	  argument	  runs	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. There	  are	  internal	  and	  necessary	  relations	  with	  and	  between	  social	  structures	  (SS);	  
2. Causal	  influences	  are	  exerted	  by	  social	  structure(s)	  (SS)	  on	  social	  interaction	  (SI);	  
3. There	  are	  causal	  relationships	  between	  groups	  and	   individuals	  at	  the	   level	  of	  social	   interaction	  
(SI);	  
4. Social	   interaction	   (SI)	   elaborates	  upon	   the	   composition	  of	   social	   structure(s)	   (SS)	  by	  modifying	  
current	   internal	   and	   necessary	   structural	   relationships	   and	   introducing	   new	   ones	   where	  
morphogenesis	   is	   concerned.	   Alternatively,	   social	   interaction	   (SI)	   reproduces	   existing	   internal	  
and	  necessary	  structural	  relations	  when	  morphostasis	  applies.	  	  
	  
The	  morphogenetic	  cycle	  demonstrates	  a	   three	  stage	  process	  of	  change,	  beginning	  with	  structural	  
conditioning	   (T1),	   examining	   social	   interaction	   (T2-­‐3),	   culminating	   in	   structural	   morphogensis	   or	  
morphostatis	   (T4).	   This	   cycle	   is	   continuous;	   thus	   T4	   of	   one	   cycle	   is	   T1	   of	   the	   next.	   The	   impact	   of	  
agency	  (SI)	  can	  clearly	  be	  seen	  and	  ultimately,	  as	  Archer	  argues,	  to	  have	  real	  change	  it	  is	  imperative	  
to	   consider	   how	   agency	  modifies	   internal	   and	   necessary	   structural	   relationships,	   introducing	   new	  
ones	  when	   required.	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   this	   aids	   our	   project	   to	   understand	  political	   change	   by	  
giving	  power	  to	  agency	  to	  facilitate	  change.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Archer,	  Realist	  social	  theory	  168-­‐169.	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As	  previously	  noted,	  Agamben	  fails	  to	  engage	  conceptually	  with	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  agency,	  beyond	  
the	  acceptance	  of	  ‘being	  thus’.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  emergence	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  fully	  constituted	  needs	  
conceptual	   development,	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   potentiality	   of	   agency	   to	   facilitate	   change,	   or	   indeed	  
replicating	   the	   actuality.	  Within	   the	   context	   of	   political	   organisation	   in	   the	  Middle	   East,	   it	   is	   clear	  
that	  agency	  has	  a	  prominent	   role	   to	  play	   in	   facilitating	  political	   change	  across	  a	   range	  of	  different	  
ways.	  Archer’s	  morphogenetic	  cycle	  provides	  a	  methodological	  approach	  to	  supplement	  Agamben’s	  
work	  on	  sovereignty,	  which,	  although	  incomplete	  and	  requires	  further	  discussion	  of	  epistemological	  
and	  ontological	  factors,	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  reintroducing	  agency	  to	  these	  discussions.	  After	  all,	  as	  this	  
article	   has	   attempted	   to	   show,	   despite	   the	   focus	   upon	   structural	   factors	   within	   discussions	   of	  
sovereignty,	  structure	  is	  grounded	  within	  and	  predicated	  upon	  agency	  and	  to	  ignore	  it	  is	  remiss.	  	  
Conclusions	  
Conceptualising	   sovereignty	   in	   today’s	   world	   is	   an	   increasingly	   problematic	   task	   and	   perhaps	  
nowhere	   is	   this	  more	   evident	   than	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.	   Identifying	   and	   interrogating	   the	   tensions	  
implicit	   in	   the	   term	   help	   us	   to	   understand	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   regime-­‐society	   tensions	   and	  
ultimately,	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings.	  The	  establishment	  of	  structures	  to	  address	  the	  challenge	  
of	  competing	  sources	  of	  authority	  has	   featured	  prominently	   in	   the	  state-­‐building	  projects	  of	  many	  
Middle	  Eastern	  states	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  agency	  has	  been	  disregarded	  all	  too	  often.	  Sovereignty	  
is	   exclusionary	   in	   increasingly	   violent	   ways	   yet	   the	   failure	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   allow	   scope	   for	  
agency	  to	  operate	  within	  discussions	  of	  sovereignty	  makes	  us	  guilty	  of	  epistemic	  violence.	  From	  the	  
pan-­‐state	  ideologies	  of	  Arabism	  and	  Islamism,	  to	  the	  term	  ‘Arab	  Street’,	  agency	  is	  marginalized	  while	  
simultaneously	  employed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  providing	  structural	  context.	  	  
When	   unpacking	   the	   term	   to	   explore	   its	   constituent	   parts,	   sovereignty	   typically	   includes	   an	  
alignment	   of	   authority	   and	   territoriality	   but	   this	   can	   be	   challenged	   across	   the	   Middle	   East.	  
Challenges	   that	   arise	   weaken	   structural	   conditions,	   restricting	   the	   capacity	   of	   agency	   to	   act	   and	  
leading	  to	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  ‘being	  thus’.	  While	  the	  idea	  of	  sovereignty	  classically	  conceived	  
may	  be	   in	   its	  embers	   in	   the	  Middle	  East,	   regimes	  do	  not	  appear	   ready	   to	  go	  out	  with	  a	  whimper;	  
rather,	  it	  appears	  that	  regimes	  will	  do	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  ensure	  that	  power	  is	  retained,	  no	  matter	  the	  
human	  cost.	  
Structural	   factors	   in	   the	   guise	   of	   governmentality	   are	   designed	   to	   control	   people	   within	   the	  
territorial	  borders	  of	  their	  states	  and	  their	  (in)ability	  to	  do	  so	  reveals	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  states.	  Sovereignty	   is	   inherently	  exclusionary	  and	  the	  need	  to	  define,	  redefine	  and	  maintain	  
	  	  




the	   exception	   exposes	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   state.	   	   Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   one	   should	  
ignore	   the	  excluded	  and,	   in	   light	  of	   the	   fracturing	  of	   the	   regional	  order	  where	  millions	  have	  been	  
displaced	   from	   homes	   internally	   and	   externally,	   those	   excluded	   are	   increasingly	   important.	   If	   the	  
conceptualisation	  of	  a	  more	  agency	  driven	  approach	  to	  understanding	  sovereignty	  is	  successful	  then	  
points	   of	   dissonance	   can	   be	   identified	   between	   structure	   and	   agency.	   From	   that,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
identify	   trends	   across	   the	   region	   to	   better	   understand	   political	   developments	   and	   change.	  
Ultimately,	   we	   must	   remember	   of	   Ibn	   Khaldoun’s	   message,	   that	   politics	   is	   fundamentally	   about	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